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This paper presents an analysis of the 2005-06 family tax system comprising the personal 
income tax, the Medicare Levy, Family Tax Benefits Parts A and B and tax offsets.  The 
results show that most families are now taxed, in effect, on the basis of joint income.   
Through a succession of reforms the Howard Government has shifted the tax burden to 
two-earner families to such an extent that many now pay close to the same amount of tax 
as a family in which only one parent need work to earn the same income while the other 
works full time at home.  This is a defining feature of joint taxation.   
 
The study also finds that families face a marginal rate schedule that is no longer 
progressive but tends to have an inverted U-shaped profile – working families in the 
middle of the distribution face the highest marginal rates. As a consequence, the incomes 
of second earners in low and average wage families are taxed effectively at the highest 
average rates in the economy. The study explains why the system is unfair and seriously 
damaging for the economy in its effects on female labour supply in an ageing population. 
On the basis of the results, the paper argues for a return to a progressive individual 
income tax system, to improve support for families and to raise female participation and 
productivity.  
 
JEL classification: H24, H31, J22 
 





  ii1 Introduction 
 
There are two key criteria for evaluating a family tax system: fairness and efficiency.  To 
assess fairness it is necessary, at the very least, to develop a ranking of households 
defined on a reliable measure of living standards, and then to examine the correlation 
between tax burdens and living standards.  To estimate efficiency gains or losses, 
information on behavioural responses to changes in net wage rates or prices is required.   
 
A number of studies assume that fairness can be assessed on the basis of tax burdens as a 
percentage of family income.  A recent example is the OECD’s (2006) comparisons of 
tax burdens as a percentage of the combined gross wage earnings of couples.
1  This is a 
mistake.  Combined earnings do not provide a reliable measure of livings standards.  
Household survey data show that parents with the same gross wage rates and childcare 
responsibilities make widely different work choices.  In a large proportion of families, 
one parent, typically the mother, works full time at home providing childcare and related 
services, and in an almost equally large number she works full time in the market using 
her income to buy-in substitute services.
2  A young family in which both parents work 
full time to earn, say $70,000 pa, does not have the same standard of living as another in 
which one parent alone earns $70,000 while the other works full time at home. A family 
tax system that imposes equal burdens on these families is unfair.  When the work 
choices of parents vary in this way, a progressive individual income tax system is 
required for fairness in the treatment of families with the same standard of living, and of 
those with varying living standards, that is, for horizontal and vertical equity. 
 
The basic rule for efficiency, established by Frank Ramsey in 1927, requires that 
effective tax rates be related inversely to (compensated) wage/price elasticities.  The 
international literature on labour supply contains an extensive body of research on wage 
elasticities.  While findings vary, the evidence suggests that male wage elasticities, 
compensated and uncompensated, are low (and possibly zero) at high income levels, and 
                                                           
1 See Tables III.5c, p.92, III.6c, p.95, and III.7c, p.98. 
2 For a life cycle analysis that shows this using Australian data see Apps and Rees (2003). 
  1therefore reducing effective tax rates on the incomes of high wage male earners will have 
little effect on either efficiency or labour supply.  In contrast, low wage earners, and 
married women in particular, tend to exhibit much more responsive labour supplies.  
High effective tax rates on their earnings can therefore be expected to reduce 
significantly the hours they work and the efficiency of the economy.  Thus, it would 
makes no sense to advocate as a priority a cut in the top tax rate on personal income if 
there are higher effective rates on the earnings of married women. This is an implication 
of the well known Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) result on the taxation couples – an 
individual tax system at progressive rates is required for efficiency because it implies 
lower marginal rates on married women as second earners.
3
 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the fairness and efficiency of the 2005-06 income tax 
system comprising the personal individual income tax, the Medicare Levy, Family Tax 
Benefits Parts A and B and tax offsets.  The analysis focuses on families with dependent 
children and couples without dependents.  Section 2 presents an analysis of tax rates on 
the incomes of parents using unit record data for “in-work” families.  The results show 
that most Australian families are now taxed, in effect, on the basis of joint income.  They 
are also found to face a marginal rate schedule that is no longer progressive but tends 
towards an inverted U-shaped profile – families in the middle of the distribution face the 
highest marginal rates. As a consequence, the incomes of second earners in low and 
average wages families are taxed at the highest average rates in the economy.  This new 
tax rate structure has shifted the tax burden towards two-earner families to such an extent 
that many now pay close to the same amount of tax as a family in which only one parent 
need work to earn the same income.   
 
Section 3 demonstrates that these findings cannot be attributed to heterogeneity, for 
example, to variation in family responsibilities across single and two-earner families. The 
section goes on to explain how the shift to joint taxation has been implemented through a 
succession of changes to family tax benefits and the use of bracket creep to shift the tax 
                                                           
3 See also Feldstein and Feenberg (1996).  
 
  2burden in real terms towards those on lower pay, and therefore towards the vast majority 
of working married women.  Section 4 examines the tax treatment of couples with no 
dependents, and compares the very different labour supplies of younger married women 
without children and married women over 40, a group likely to have older children who 
are no longer dependent or have left home.  Section 5 follows with a more detailed 
analysis of the life cycle labour supply of families and couples, to highlight the large gap 
between male and female labour supplies and the dangers of a tax system that continues 
to impose high average tax rates on the second income in an ageing population.  
Concluding comments and directions for reform are discussed in Section 6. 
 
2  Taxation of “in-work” families in 2005-06 
 
An important lesson of modern tax theory, originating with the optimal tax literature of 
the early 1970s, is that it makes no sense to analyse personal income taxes separately 
from tax credits, levies or offsets, or from cash transfers such as family tax benefits, as in 
a number of recent studies.
4  Any such set of policy instruments can always be translated 
into an effective marginal rate schedule and an implicit “lump sum” or non-means tested 
benefit for a given family or individual. In other words, a change in marginal tax rates 
can be introduced either by changing benefit withdrawal rates, tax offsets, etc, or simply, 
and more transparently, by announcing a new set of marginal rates.  
  
This section examines the structure of marginal and average tax rates faced by parents, as 
determined by four key policy instruments of the income tax system: the individual 
personal income tax, the low income tax offset, the Medicare Levy, and Family Tax 
Benefits Part A and Part B (FTB-A and FTB-B).
5  Consistent with international tax 
literature, cash transfers in the form of FTBs are treated as negative taxes.  
 
                                                           
4 See, for example, Turnbull and Temple (2005) and Davidson (2005). 
5 The analysis does not incorporate Child Care Benefit. This is unlikely to alter the findings of the study.  
The available evidence suggests that subsided childcare is used extensively by single-earner families, and 
household expenditure survey data indicate that government expenditure on childcare tends to be 
distributed independently of employment status. 
  3The analysis draws on a sample of 1656 two-parent families from the ABS 2002 Survey 
of Income and Housing (SIH) selected on the following criteria: the family is a couple 
income unit with dependent children, at least one parent is employed, both parents are 
aged between 20 and under 65 years; earnings are principally from wages and salaries; 
and incomes from earnings, investments and unincorporated enterprises are non-negative. 
All incomes are indexed to the 2005-06 financial year.  
 
Families in which both parents are unemployed or out of the workforce are excluded in 
order to focus the analysis on the income tax system, as defined by the above policy 
instruments, rather than on the wider welfare system.  This restriction excludes relatively 
few records.  In the full sample of families, 90 per cent of male partners aged 20 to 65 are 
employed - 85 per cent full time and 5 per cent part time.  Of the remaining, 3 per cent 
are unemployed and 7 per cent are not in the workforce.  In contrast, the full time 
employment rate of mothers is only 28 per cent.  Their part time rate is 35 per cent.  Only 
2 per cent report being unemployed.  The remaining 35 per cent are not in the workforce.  
 
For the purpose of the analysis, the parent with the higher private income is defined as 
the “primary earner”. Private income, as defined by the ABS (2005), is income from all 
non-government sources such as wages and salaries, profits, investment income and 
superannuation.  The primary earner is the male partner in 87 per cent of records in the 
sample and therefore in the discussion to follow the second earner will be referred to as 
the female partner.  
 
Table 1 first of all reports, in the upper panel, the amount of tax families would pay if all 
had only one earner, in other words, if the second earner did not work.  The results are 
presented for a quintile ranking of families by primary private income. The first two rows 
give weighted data means for the primary earner’s annual earnings and hours of work and 
the third row, the annual asset income of the household.  The fourth row shows the 
percentage of primary earners employed full time in each quintile. Overall, 92 per cent 
are employed full time.  The fifth row reports the average amount of tax the family pays 
when there is only one earner, and the final row, the family’s average tax rate (ATR) as a 
  4percentage of the income the family would have if there was only one earner, which is 
the sum of primary earnings and assent income.  
 
The lower panel reports data means for the earnings and labour supply of the second 
earner and also gives the percentage of families in which she is employed full time and 
part time.  The final two rows show the tax on her earnings, calculated as the increment 
in the family’s tax burden due to her participation in the labour force.  The ATR reports 
the result as a percentage of second earnings.   
 
  Table 1  Weighted data means for “in-work” families, 2005-06  
 
Quintile  1 2 3  4  5 All 
Panel 1     
1. Primary earnings $pa  26889 41154 52003  66329 113180 59404 
2. Primary labour supply, hours pa   1989 2165 2234  2340  2419  2228 
3. Asset income  258 695 740 1108 4288 1392 
4. % employed full time  79.4 93.8 94.3  97.6  95.0  92.0 
5. Tax on primary + asset income $pa  -9334 -640 3949 10706 36245  7923 
6. ATR %  -34.7  -1.6 7.6 16.1 32.0 13.3 
Panel 2    
1. Second earnings $pa  8421 16349  21736  21519 22702 18116 
2. Second labour supply, hours pa  678 1001  1096 1054  970  960 
3. % employed full time  24.3 33.7 34.1  31.7  26.4  30.1 
4. % employed part time  25.6 34.2 34.9  38.3  38.5  34.3 
5. Tax on second earnings $pa  4284 6010 7178  6784  6972  6243 
6. ATR %  50.9 36.8 33.0  31.5  30.7  34.5 
 
 
The results are striking.  The average tax paid by the representative family in the sample 
is $14,166, the sum of the amount paid as a single-earner family, $7,923, and the tax on 
second earnings, $6,243.  Thus, if all families had only one earner or, equivalently, if all 
second earners withdrew from work, the average tax per family in the sample would fall 
from  $14,708 pa to $8,358 pa, that is, by over 44 per cent.  This dramatic fall is due to 
very high effective ATRs on second earnings.  The ATR on the single-earner family’s 
average income of $59,404 pa is only 13.3 per cent.  The second earner faces an ATR of 
34.5 per cent on earnings of only $18,116.  ATRs on the single-earner family are not only 
low on average but also highly progressive.  We have a negative income tax up to the 
second quintile, with those in quintile 1 receiving a net transfer that averages $9,334 pa.  
  5The ATR rises to 7.6 per cent in quintile 3 and then to 32.0 per cent in quintile 5.  This 
progressive taxation of the single earner contrasts sharply with the treatment of the 
second earner.  The profile of ATRs on her earnings is regressive.  In the bottom quintile, 
the ATR is 50.9 per cent on an average income of only $8,421 pa.
6  The ATR falls to 
30.7 per cent in the top quintile, where the average second income is $22,702 pa.   
 
The lower panel of the table reports average tax burdens and therefore conceals the wide 
variation in burdens associated with the heterogeneity in female labour supply at each 
level of primary income, which is evident from the profiles of the full time and part time 
employment rates of second earners. In around 30 per cent of cases, both parents work 
full time and in over 35 per cent, only one parent is employed. Thus the tax profiles 
understate the actual burdens for the two-earner family, especially for those in which both 
parents work full time. 
  
To show how tax burdens depend on the employment of the second parent, Table 2 
presents results for the sample partitioned into three family groups: single-earner 
families, two-earner families with the second earner employed part-time (PT), and two-
earner families with both parents in full-time (FT) work.  The data means for these 
groups indicate there is relatively little variation in primary earnings, asset incomes and 
hours across these groups within each quintile, apart from the top quintile.  In the top 
quintile the data mean for the primary earnings of the single-earner family is $125,164, 
which is significantly above the mean of $109,931 for the PT two-earner family and of 
$102,013 for the FT two-earner family.   
 
As we would expect, the quintile profiles of average tax burdens and ATRs for the single-
earner family tend to match those reported in Table 1 for the full sample with second 
earnings set to zero.  In the PT two-earner family, the second earner pays an average tax 
of $7,081 pa, compared with her overall average of $6,243, shown in Table 1.  Tax 
burdens on the second earnings are again relatively flat across the distribution, with the 
                                                           
6 The very high rate in the bottom quintiles is due partly to loss of welfare benefits as well as family tax 
benefits. 
  6result that ATRs are strongly regressive on the second income.  In quintile 2, the ATR is 
over 40 per cent on an average income of a little over $16,000 pa.      
 
 
  Table 2  Tax burdens and ATRs by employment status  
 
 Quintile  1  2  3  4  5  All 
Single-earner families             
Family income $pa  28438 46059 56483  73178 132630 63928 
Tax on family income $pa  -9106 -162 4356 11973 42818  8316 
ATR - family income %  -32.0 -0.3  7.7  16.4  32.3  13.0 
PT two-earner families           
Family income $pa  41135 57501 76268  89634 139011 83756 
Tax on family income $pa  -1581 5339 11637 17321 42064 16233 
ATR – family income %  -3.8 9.3 15.3 19.3 30.3 19.4 
Second earnings $pa  13102 16328 23373  21738  25045  20409 
Tax on second earnings $pa  6562 6585 7930  6683  7510  7081 
ATR - second earnings %   50.1 40.3 33.9  30.7  30.0  34.7 
FT two-earner families            
Family income $pa  44375 70471 88974 103110 151862 91138 
Tax on family income $pa  -365 10672 16746 22928 45427 18741 
ATR – family income %  -0.8 15.1 19.8 22.2  29.9  20.6 
Second earnings $pa  16634 28036 36116  36110  45536  32718 
Tax on second earnings $pa  8098 9706  11854  11447 14139 11060 
ATR – second earnings %  48.7 34.6 32.8  31.7  31.1  33.8 
 
 
What this means is that a married mother in quintile 2 who decides to work part time in 
the market rather than full time at home will, on average, earn a little over $16,000 and 
lose over 40 per cent in taxes and reduced FTBs. She will also contribute more to GST 
revenue, because her additional income will be used to buy-in GST rated goods and 
services as substitutes for those she could produce herself by working full time at home.
 7    
 
For the FT two-earner family, the picture is more extreme in terms of absolute tax 
burdens.  The average income of the second earner is $32,718, on which the tax is 
$11,060 pa.  Note that the ATR on the FT two-earner family in quintile 2 is 15.1 per cent 
on a family income of $70,471, only slightly below the ATR of 16.4 per cent on the 
                                                           
7 In addition, she will have to pay the 9 per cent Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC).The ongoing 
debate concerning whether  the SGC is a tax misses the point.  The central question is whether the 
reduction in the net wage it causes has significant disincentive effects, and whether its overall distributional 
  7single-earner family’s income of $73,178 in quintile 4.  Thus, on average, the FT two-
earner family in quintile 2 pays close to the same amount of tax as the single-earner 
family in quintile 4.  Similarly, the ATR for the PT two-earner family in quintile 2 is 
close to that of the single-earner family with almost the same family income in quintile 3. 
These figures reflect the Howard Government's shift towards a system of joint taxation, 
through successive increases in joint and second income targeted family benefits 
combined with the use of bracket creep to reduce the progressivity of the individual 
personal income tax and, thereby, to increase the tax burden on low and average wage 
workers.  The latter include the vast majority of employed married mothers.   
 
The pivotal role of bracket creep, in combination with the FTB system, in the shift 
towards the joint taxation of families up to around the mean of the fourth quintile, should 
not be underestimated.  The Howard Government has compensated higher income 
earners by raising the upper tax thresholds and single-earner families by increasing 
family tax benefits.  Because FTBs are withdrawn on family income and on the income 
of the second earner, two-earner families on low to average pay, especially those in 
which both parents are in full-time work, are largely excluded from both forms of 
compensation.  Low to average wage single individuals have also been heavily penalised, 
together with couples without children in the same wage categories as shown in Section 4 
below. 
 
A defining feature of joint taxation is equal, or near equal, taxation of families with the 
same combined income. This means that family tax burdens are independent of the intra-
family distribution of earnings and therefore of total hours worked, at a given level of 
joint income.  Under such a system the FT two-earner family is required, in effect, to 
work longer hours for the government than the single-earner family able to earn the same 
income with only one full-time job.   Table 3 shows the distribution of “hours worked to 
pay tax”, or the “hours of work equivalent” of the family’s tax, across single and two-
earner families for those quintiles in which average burdens are positive.  In quintile 2, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
impact is fair.  For low income earners who would otherwise be recipients of the age pension, it is clearly 
not a fully contributory levy, especially in an imperfect capital market.   
  8the average tax burden on the FT two-earner family is the equivalent of 706 hours of 
work for the government, almost as many hours as the representative single-earner family 
in quintile 5.  In quintile 3, the single-earner family works the equivalent of 139 hours to 
pay tax while the PT two-earner family in the same quintile works 706 hours and the FT 
two-earner family, 892 hours. In last case, the FT two-earner family works more hours 
for the government than the single-earner family in quintile 5 on a much higher income.   
 
 
  Table 3  Hours worked to pay tax 
 
 Quintile  1  2  3  4  5 
Single-earner families           
Hours worked to pay tax pa  - -  139  349  775 
PT two-earner families         
Hours worked to pay tax pa  - 313  533  660  1012 
FT two-earner families        
Hours worked to pay tax pa  - 706  892  967  1270 
 
 
Can a tax system, which imposes such unequal burdens on single and two-earner families 
in the same quintile of primary income, be judged as fair under any set of empirically 
plausible conditions? The answer to this question depends on how we view home 
production.  If we believe it is plausible to assume that there is no home production, that 
the stay-at-home mother spends her time entirely on leisure, then it could be viewed as 
fair to allow couples to split their incomes or, equivalently, to tax families on the basis of 
joint income.  The assumption is, however, contradicted by time use data, as well as by 
casual observation.  Moreover, there is as at least one further assumption required. 
Husbands must be assumed to share their incomes equally with their wives. In other 
words, we need a model in which mothers are totally unproductive at home and, 
motivated by altruism, husbands fund an intra-household lump sum transfer equal to half 
their incomes to support the consumption of their wives. There is no exchange within the 
household.
8  This model is rejected by the results of the literature on the intra-household 
distribution of family resources.
9
                                                           
8 For models that recognise household production and intra-family exchange, see Apps and Rees (1999a, 
1999b). 
9 See, for example, Apps and Rees (2002) and Lundberg et al (1997). 
  9 
Time use data indicate clearly that, after the arrival of the first child, the lower wage 
parent, typically the mother, faces the choice between working at home, providing 
childcare and related domestic services, or working in the market and buying-in childcare 
and substitutes for related home produced goods and services.  There are gains and losses 
associated with each option.  Mothers who work full-time at home avoid personal income 
taxes, the GST and the SGC on their implicit income from, and expenditure on, home 
production, and they gain large FTBs.  However, they lose work experience and may 
therefore face a lower wage later in the life cycle, which has associated risks especially in 
relation to single parenthood.  On the other hand, the mother who goes out to work may 
find that her after tax income is not sufficient to cover the high cost of childcare run for 
profit in a market with excess demand. The family may actually have to borrow to 
finance childcare in an imperfect capital market with a high borrowing rate.
10 In both 
cases the family needs to predict the mother’s future earning capacity.  Under these 
conditions it is not surprising to observe low average female hours relative to male hours, 
despite the large fall in fertility over recent decades.  Nor is it surprising to observe a high 
degree of heterogeneity in female hours across seemingly identical families, who are 
making different assessments of the gains and losses associated with the choice between 
working at home and in the market.   
 
The system also makes no sense in terms of distributional outcomes.  It is clear that in the 
short run a household in which the primary income parent earns around $70,000 pa for 
full-time work while the second parent works at home providing child care and other 
domestic services has a much higher standard of living than a family in which both 
parents must work full-time to earn the same income and must buy-in childcare.  As 
noted in the Introduction, a system that places the same tax, or close to the same tax, on 
these two families fails in terms of horizontal equity.  It also fails in terms of the 
progressivity of the overall system, due to the higher tax burdens on lower wage families, 
as indicated by the “hours of work to pay tax” profiles in Table 3.   
 
                                                           
10 For an analysis of the effects of these conditions on female labour supply, see Apps and Rees (2003). 
  103  Tax rates for representative families  
 
The preceding analysis raises an obvious question: To what extent is the gap between the 
average tax profiles of single and two-earner families an artifact of demographic variation 
across the two groups, or of other sources of heterogeneity, rather than an outcome of the 
tax rate structure?  For example, if, on average, single-earner families have more children 
they will receive more in FTBs, and this could account for their lower ATRs. In fact, the 
data show that single-earner families have an average of 1.93 children whereas the figure 
for two-earner families is 1.85.    
 
To demonstrate that the results are driven by the tax rate structure and not by variation in 
family size, primary earnings or asset incomes, this section presents tax profiles for 
hypothetical single and two-earner families with identical demographic characteristics 
and primary earnings within each quintile.  Primary and second earnings across quintiles 
are set at the data means reported in the preceding tables.  Asset incomes are set to zero.  
Taxes are calculated as the sum of personal income taxes and the Medicare levy, less the 
low income tax offset and FTBs. Government cash benefits outside the FTB system, 
which are included in the calculation of effective taxes in the preceding section, are 
excluded.  Table 4 reports the tax profiles for a family with 2 children under 13 and at 
least one under 5, and Table 5, for a family with 3 children under 13 and at least one 
under 5. 
 
The profiles confirm the findings of the preceding section.   Second earners face high 
ATRs consistent with a system of joint taxation. Moreover, from a comparison of profiles 
across the tables we can see that the tax treatment of the second earner tends to get worse 
as the number of children increases.  For the 3-child, FT two-earner family in quintile 2, 
the ATR on the second income is almost 50 per cent.  The excessively high ATRs on 
second earners translate into a large “tax wedge”, defined as the ratio of the effective tax 
on the second income and the tax the second earner would face as a single individual on 
 
 
  11  Table 4  Families with 2 children under 12 and one under 5  
 
  Quintile  1 2 3 4 5 
Primary earnings $pa  26889 41154 52003 66329  113180 
Single-earner families         
Tax on family income $pa  -7872 -1393 4194 10225 35070 
ATR - family income %  -29.3 -3.4  8.1  15.4 31.0 
Two-earner families PT      
Tax on family income $pa  -3313  5880  11744 16076 42094 
ATR – family income %  -8.3 10.2 15.6 18.3 30.5 
Tax on second earnings $pa  4559 7273 7550 5851 7025 
ATR - second earnings %   34.8 44.5 32.3 26.9 28.0 
Tax wedge  5.49 5.20 2.47 2.36 1.92 
Two-earner families FT      
Tax on family income $pa  -1317  9960  15922 24388 48646 
ATR - family income %  -3.0 14.4 18.1 23.7 30.6 
Tax on second earnings $pa  6554  11352 11728 13416 13576 
ATR – second earnings %  39.4 40.5 32.5 39.2 29.8 




  Table 5  Families with 3 children under 12 and one under 5  
 
  Quintile  1 2 3 4 5 
Primary earnings $pa  26889 41154 52003 66329  113180 
Single-earner families         
Tax on family income $pa  -12073 -5594  -7  7771  35070 
ATR - family income %  -44.9 -13.6  0.0  11.7  31.0 
Two-earner families PT      
Tax on family income $pa  -7514 1679 9967 14298  42094 
ATR – family income %  -18.8 2.9  13.2 16.2 30.5 
Tax on second earnings $pa  4559 7273 9973 6528 7025 
ATR - second earnings %   34.8 44.5 42.7 30.0 28.0 
Tax wedge  5.49 5.20 3.26 2.63 1.92 
Two-earner families FT      
Tax on family income $pa  -5518  8077  14145 20835 48646 
ATR – family income %  -12.7 11.7 16.1 20.3 30.6 
Tax on second earnings $pa  6554  13671 14151 13064 13576 
ATR – second earnings %  39.4 48.8 39.2 36.2 29.8 
Tax wedge  4.35 2.91 1.96 1.95 1.33 
 
the same income.
11  Second earners in part-time work and those in full-time work in the 
bottom two quintiles face a tax wedge that ranges from 2.91 to 5.49 and higher. 
                                                           
11 Jaumotte (2003) ranks OECD countries according to this tax wedge, for female earnings levels of 67 per 
cent and 100 per cent of Average Production Worker earnings (APW) and the male level held at 100 per 
  12 
Because the Howard Government’s strategy for switching towards joint taxation has been 
to use a succession of family tax benefit reforms combined with bracket creep, rather 
than through a transparent change in the tax base from the individual to the family, the 
system now in place differs from the more conventional joint tax systems of other 
countries in two important respects.  First, the taxation of incomes at the top of the 
distribution tends to remain on an individual basis because FTBs are fully withdrawn at 
high income levels, apart from FTB-B.  Second, because the system been introduced by 
withdrawing family benefits on joint income and the income of the second earner, the 
marginal tax rate (MTR) schedule tends to exhibit an inverted U-shaped profile with 
respect to joint income, instead of the usual progressive profile.  Consequently, when 
combined with the entire welfare system, the overall profile of effective marginal tax 
rates on income tends to be downward sloping.   
  
It is of interest to see more precisely how family tax benefits, tax offsets, and the 
Medicare Levy have been used to replace Australia’s progressive individual income tax 
with a system that approximates one of joint taxation with high MTRs across average 
incomes.  For the purpose of illustration we take the case of the family with three 
children in Table 5, and show how these policy instruments have been used to change 
dramatically the structure of tax rates on primary and second incomes. 
 
Table 6 first of all lists the 2005-06 schedule of MTRs on personal income and then 
reports the effective marginal rates that apply when the low income tax offset is 
included.
12  The offset raises the tax free threshold from $6,000 to $7,567 and introduces 
a new MTR of 34 cents in the dollar across a new income band of $21,600 to $27,475, 
and so we see the emergence of a “hump” in an otherwise progressive MTR profile.  The 
offset is entirely redundant as a separate policy instrument.  The same changes could 
                                                                                                                                                                             
cent of APW, in 2000-2001. The study obtains a result for Australia of 1.4. The figures here show that the 
tax wedge is much higher than this for most families.  
12 A taxpayer with a taxable income below $27,475 is entitled to a low income tax offset of up to $235.  
This offset is withdrawn at a rate of 4 cents in the dollar on an income over $21,600, to create the new 
MTR of 34 cents in the dollar above this threshold. 
  13have been announced simply, and more transparently, as a new MTR schedule on 
individual incomes.  
 
The third section of the table lists the MTR schedule when the Medicare Levy is 
included.
13  The number of bands increases to eight and there is a more pronounced 
hump in the profile.  In fact, the highest MTR no longer applies to the top income band, 
but to a relatively low income band.  We begin to see a shift towards an inverted U-
shaped profile. This is due to the withdrawal of the Medicare Levy exemption at 20 cents 
in the dollar at the specified lower and upper family income limits.  For the 3-child 
family, the limits are $34,227 and $37,000,
14 respectively, and so the family’s MTR rises 
to 50% across this range of income. Because the limits are defined on family income, the 
Medicare Levy is also a step towards joint taxation.  Again, as a separate policy 
instrument, the Medicare Levy is entirely redundant and serves only to reduce the 
transparency of the underlying tax rate changes. 
 
Table 6  3-child family - effective MTRs  
 
Individual income tax  + Low income tax offset   + Medicare Levy 
Taxable Income $pa  MTR   Taxable income $pa  MTR  Taxable Income $pa  MTR 
$0 - $6,000 
$6,001 - $21,600 
 
 
$21,601 - $63,000 
 










$0 - $7,567 
$7,568 - $21,600 
$21,601-$27,475 
 
$27,476 - $63,000 
 










$0 - $7,567 
$7,568 - $21,600 
$21,601 - $27,475  
$27,476 - $34,226 
$34,227 - $37,001 
$37,002 - $63,000 












Family tax benefits have a more profound effect of the same kind on the MTR profile. 
Table 7 shows the income profiles of effective MTRs after adding in FTB-A for the 
single-earner family.  The maximum rate of FTB-A is $4201.15
15 for a dependent child 
under 13. The base rate, including the supplement, is $1,777.55 for each child.  Benefits 
                                                           
13 The Medicare levy is normally calculated at 1.5 per cent of taxable income. There are exemption 
categories or reductions based on income, and there is a surcharge for individuals and families on higher 
incomes who do not have private patient hospital cover, calculated at an additional 1 per cent of taxable 
income. 
14 The figures are based on rates for 2004/05.  Those for 2005/06 are not yet available. 
15  This includes the $627.80 Supplement for 2005-06. 
  14up to the base rate are withdrawn at 20 cents in the dollar on every dollar above the lower 
family income threshold of $33,361.  For the 3-child family, the income limit at which 
the benefit, excluding the base rate, is completely phased out is $69,715.  The effect is to 
create a much more significant hump in the middle of the distribution, with MTRs of over 
50 cent in the dollar on incomes from just over $34,000 to almost $70,000 pa. At  
$93,075 the base rate of FTB-A is withdrawn at 30 cent in the dollar and so effective 
MTRs rise by this amount until the upper income limit of $110,851.  The gap between the 
two humps depends on the number and ages of the children.
16  
 






ATR at upper 
threshold 
$0 - $7,567 
$7,568 - $21,600 
$21,601 -$27,475  
$27,476 - $33,361 
$33,362 - $34,226 
$34,227 - $37,001 
$37,002 - $63,000 
$63,001- $69,715 
$69,716 - $93,074 





























The final column of the table lists ATRs, calculated at the upper income thresholds for 
each MTR.  Although the family faces high MTRs across a wide band of income above 
$33,361, ATRs are low, and in fact negative up to over $50,000, as in the tables of the 
preceding section.  This is because FTBs, including FTB-B of $3372.60, are large.  The 
system is equivalent to one under which income is taxed at the MTRs shown in the table 
and the family receives a universal or lump sum transfer equal to its FTBs, which in this 
case amounts to $13,165.55 pa.  This example serves to illustrate how a change in the 
withdrawal rates of family benefits, or in tax offsets and credits, can always be translated 
into a new MTR schedule, while a change in the size of FTBs represents a change in the 
implicit lump sum. The widely prevalent idea that universal benefits are “unaffordable” 
                                                           
16 An EITC program of the kind proposed, for example, by the “Five Economists” eliminates a gap of this 
kind, by taxing families within the relevant income range at higher rates, as shown in Apps (2003).  
  15reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the tax structure and the criteria that are 
relevant for evaluating a tax change.  What matters is the distributional impact of the 
reform and the efficiency gains/losses induced by the changes in the MTR schedule.   
 
It is an open question as to whether the high MTRs across the middle of the distribution 
of primary earnings in Table 7 have large work disincentive effects. Empirical estimates 
tend to indicate that the labour supply of prime age males, especially those in higher 
paying jobs, tends to be unresponsive to a change in the net wage.  Thus, the high MTRs 
at the middle and upper end of the distribution of primary income may have a relatively 
small effect on labour supply, and a low efficiency cost.  However, the effects on the 
lower to middle range of the distribution may be significant. 
 
Given that FTB-A and the Medicare Levy are withdrawn on family income, the tax rates 
faced by the second earner depend on the primary earner’s income, as in any joint tax 
system with varying MTRs.  Thus we need to choose a level of that income. We first 
select a primary income of $41,000 pa for full time work, which is approximately equal 
to average primary earnings in quintile 2 (Table 1).  Table 8 lists the effective MTRs and 
ATRs faced by the second earner and also includes the ATRs she would face as a single 
individual.  The final column of the table reports the tax wedge she faces, computed as 
the ratio of her tax as a second earner and as a single individual.  
 
Table 8    3-child family: Primary earnings = $41,000 pa 
 
Second earner  Single indiv.  Taxable Income $pa 
Tax $pa  MTR  ATR  ATR 
Tax 
wedge 
$0 - $4088 
$4089 - $7,567 
$7,568 - $20,951 
$20,952 - $21,600 
$21,601 - $27,476 
$27,477 - $28,761  






































The second earner’s first dollar of income is taxed at a rate of 21.5 cents due to the 
withdrawal of FTB-A at 20 cents in the dollar on joint income and the 1.5 Medicare Levy 
  16rate.  At the lower income limit of $4,088 for FTB-B, her MTR rises another 20 cents, to 
41.5 cents.   The withdrawal of FTB-B on the second income, together with the 
withdrawal of FTB-A on joint income, has the effect of denying the second earner a zero 
MTR on her income up to the individual threshold of $7,567.  She is also denied a low 
MTR of 15 cents in the dollar across the next band of the individual income tax scale. 
Instead, she faces an MTR of 56.5 cents in the dollar. On a very narrow band of income - 
$20,953 to $21,600 - she faces an MTR of 36.5 cents in the dollar because FBT-B has 
been completely phased out at the lower threshold of this band.  At $21,601, her MTR 
rises to 55.5 cent in the dollar.  Only when her income reaches $28,762 does her MTR 
fall substantially because, at this level of income, family income has moved into the 
income range that is taxed at lower rates under the inverted U-shape schedule applying to 
family income.   
 
The profile of ATRs indicates the consequences of high MTRs at low levels of second 
income.  As the second earner moves across the second band above the zero rated 
threshold of the personal income tax, her ATR reaches 48.8 per cent, in other words, the 
second earner loses almost half her income in taxes and reduced FTBs, well over twice 
the amount she would lose as a single individual, as indicated by the tax wedge figures.   
For example, if she earns $29,000 to raise her family income to $70,000, she loses 
$14,111, or 48.7 per cent of her income.  Had she chosen to work full time at home, the 
family would have received a negative tax of $5,673.  By going out to work, the second 
earner has raised the family’s tax burden to $8,437, or 12.1 per cent of family income.  
The tax paid by a family able to earn the same income with only one parent in work, and 
the other working full time at home, is $10,045, or 14.3 per cent of family income.  By 
taxing the second earner at very high average rates, the Howard Government has raised 
the burden on the two-earner family to such an extent that it now pays close to the same 
amount in tax as a single-earner family with the same income.    
 
The tax penalty on a second earner in a family with a lower primary income can be even 
greater.  Table 9 reports the marginal and average tax rates, as well as the tax wedge, 
faced by the second earner in a family in which the primary income is $35,000.  Her 
  17effective tax at $29,000 of income is $14,538, which is over half her income.  At $35,000 
it is $17,571, again over half her income.  The family’s ATR on a joint income of 
$70,000 is 12.1, the same as in the previous example.  In terms of hours of work to pay 
tax, the FT (40 hour per week) two-earner family with a joint income of $70,000, with 
each parent earning $35,000 pa, works 20.1 hours per week for the government.  The 
single-earner family with the same income, and therefore on a much higher wage, works 
5.7 hours per week for the government. 
 
Table 9    3-child family: Primary earnings = $35,000 pa 
 
Second earner  Single    
Taxable Income $pa  Tax $pa  MTR  ATR  ATR 
Tax 
wedge 
$0 - $2,000 
$2,000 - $4,088 
$4089 - $7,567 
$7,568 - $20,951 
$20,952 - $21,600 
$21,601 - $27,476 
$27,477 - $34,715 











































FTB-B is an especially anomalous component of the system.  For a two-earner family 
with a child under 5, it is fully withdrawn on a joint income of $41,906 if earned equally 
by both parents. If only one parent needs to work to earn the same income, the family 
receives the full amount of FTB-B, $3372.60
17 for a child under 5 years.  Thus, the role 
of FTB-B cannot be said to be that of supporting families, since it fails to support the 
two-earner family on a very low joint income and working longer hours.      
 
A family tax system with such punitive taxes on the income of second earners can be 
expected to have large and significant effects on female labour supply. Available 
estimates of female wage elasticities indicate that high tax rates have a strong negative 
impact when the children are young, and that this effect persists across the life cycle.  The 
result is easy to understand.  For families with young children, home production is a close 
substitute for market output over a range of services, most importantly, childcare.  If 
                                                           
17 This includes the supplement available only at the end of the financial year. 
  18married mothers face ATRs on their earnings in the order of 50 per cent for part time and 
full time work, and quality child care is not available at an affordable price, it is not be 
surprising to find that they reduce their hours significantly, or switch from working in the 
market to working at home entirely.  And as a consequence, their productivity in the 
market work declines, which results in a long term negative effect over the life cycle, in 
addition to the short term impact when the children are young.
18
  
4  Taxation of “in-work” couples with no dependents 
 
We now turn to couples without children, and examine the tax rates they face due to the 
combined effects of the individual income tax, the low income tax offset, the Medicare 
Levy, and the dependent spouse tax offset. The analysis is based on a sample of 1313 
couple income unit records drawn from the ABS 2002 SIH on the same criteria as the 
sample for families, but excluding records with dependent children present.  As before, 
incomes are indexed to the 2005-06 financial year. 
 
Again, for the purpose of the analysis, the partner with the higher private income is 
defined as the “primary earner”.  Following the format of Table 1, Table 10, Panel 1, 
reports weighted data means for primary income and hours, asset incomes, and the 
amount of tax couples would pay, and their ATR, if all had only one earner.  For the 
purpose of comparison, the results are presented for the same quintile ranking of primary 
private income as in Table 1.  Couples without children make up 44.4 per cent of the full 
sample of married couples selected on the criteria outlined, and their distribution by 
primary income closely follows that of families, as indicated by the quintile profile in the 
last row of the table.  
 
From row 6 of Panel 1 it can be seen that single-earner couples pay much higher taxes 
than single-earner families in the first four quintiles, as we would expect since they do 
not receive FTB-A and the dependent spouse tax offset is less than FTB-B.  Second 
earners with no dependents in quintiles 2 and 3 have higher incomes than working 
                                                           
18 For an analysis of these effects in the US context, see Attanasio et al. (2003). 
  19married mothers because they have a higher full time employment rate and work longer 
hours as shown in row 3 of the tables.  Nevertheless they effectively pay lower taxes, 
because they lose only the dependent spouse tax offset. However, due to the withdrawal 
of the offset, ATRs on second earnings are above those on primary incomes in the lower 
three quintiles.  The dependent spouse tax offset, like FTB-B, has the effect of denying 
the second earner a zero rated threshold and of raising the marginal rate up to the next tax 
threshold by several percentage points.  
 
Table 10   Weighted data means for “in-work” couples with no dependents, 2005-06 
 
Quintile  1 2 3  4 5 All 
Panel 1           
1. Primary earnings $pa  25645 40683 51930  65677  108567 55940 
2. Primary labour supply, hours pa   1879 2085 2245  2337 2450  2183 
3. Asset income  688 624  1434  3157  5016  2014 
4. % employed full time  69.5 92.5 96.3  96.8 98.1  90.2 
5. Tax on family income $pa  -1017 6923 11309  16707  37335 13106 
6. ATR %  -4.0 17.0 21.8  25.4 34.4 23.4 
Panel 2     
1. Second earnings $pa  12190 21795 26947  29136  35471  24509 
2. Second labour supply, hours pa  1082 1367 1554  1375  1381  1351 
3. % employed full time  43.2 56.0 62.8  57.4  53.1  54.5 
4. % employed part time  31.6 24.2 19.5  21.2  19.9  23.5 
5. Tax on second earnings $pa  4539 5026 6215  7022  9354  6275 
6. ATR %  37.2 23.1 23.1  24.1  26.4  25.6 
          
% - couples with no dependents  45.9 46.2 45.9  41.8 41.3  44.4 
 
 
The higher hours and full-time employment rates reported in Table 10 for second earners 
with no dependents should not be interpreted as evidence of a substantial increase in the 
labour supply of mothers after the children leave home.  In fact, there is relatively little 
change.  This becomes evident when the sample is split into two broad life cycle phases: 
couples in the early phase who have not yet had children and those in the later phase 
when the children have left home. Since data on whether the female partner has had 
children, or plans to have them, are not available, the sample is split according to whether 
the female partner is aged less than 40 years or 40 years or over. Table 11 reports the 
results for the former group in Panel 1, and for the latter group, in Panel 2. 
 
  20If the female partner is under 40, the full time employment rate of second earners is 73.3 
per cent, and they work an average of 1713 hours pa.  In contrast, couples in which the 
female partner is over 40 years or more have a full time employment rate of only 41.3 per 
cent, and average annual hours that are much closer to the hours worked by married 
mothers, at 1097 pa.  This is consistent with US studies that find strong evidence of 
“persistence” – mothers who work significant hours after the children have left home are 
mostly those who worked while the children were present, and conversely.
19  
 
  Table 11   Couples – life cycle effects  
 
Panel 1: Pre-child phase 38.8 42.7 46.3  40.2 38.0  41.4 
1. Second earnings $pa  14163 27699 35640  36422 46242  31343 
2. Second labour supply, hours pa  1423 1721 1882  1701 1798  1713 
3. % employed full time  50.9 77.5 84.0  75.6 76.1  73.3 
4. % employed part time  35.6 17.6 10.0  16.0  9.7  17.8 
5. Tax on second earnings $pa  5426 6419 8371  8954  12206 8041 
6. ATR %  38.3 23.2 23.5  24.6 26.4  17.4 
Panel 2: Post dependent child phase 61.2 57.2 53.7  59.8 62.0  58.6 
1. Second earnings $pa  10941 17379 19463  24235 28875  19677 
2. Second labour supply, hours pa  866 1104  1254  1164  1123 1096 
3. % employed full time  38.3 39.9 44.5  45.1 38.9  41.3 
4. % employed part time  29.1 29.2 27.7  24.7 26.1  27.5 
5. Tax on second earnings $pa  3977 3984 4359  5723 7607  5026 
6. ATR %  36.3 22.9 22.4  23.6 26.3  25.5 
 
 
Note, finally, that younger couples pay, on average, significantly higher taxes than older 
couples because a higher proportion pays tax on two incomes and lose the dependent 
spouse tax offset.  And since the vast majority has earnings below the upper income tax 
thresholds, they are hit twice by the lack of compensation for bracket creep.  This limits 
their capacity to save for the purposes of house purchase and for the future costs of 





                                                           
19 See, for example, Shaw (1994). 
  215  Life cycle labour supplies  
 
The report of the Australian Government (2004) entitled “Australia’s Demographic 
Challenges” offers the following assessment of the Howard Government’s family tax 
system: 
  
“The Government has already introduced extensive changes to taxes and 
benefits to assist families.  Analysis has shown that the tax and social 
security system is neutral in its treatment of dual versus single income 
families.  That is, the balance of the system is about right.” 
 
No studies showing that “the balance is about right” are cited.   
 
The report also fails to acknowledge the large and persistent gap between female and 
male labour supplies that is evident in household survey data.  Instead, it cites OECD 
statistics showing a sharply rising female participation rate from 1960 to recent years. 
This is a misleading indicator of changes in female labour supply.  The steep increase in 
participation has not been matched by an increase in female hours of work because much 
of the growth in female employment is due to part-time work, which is often at low 
annual hours.  Thus, while female and male rates of participation are tending to converge, 
with the former now over 75 percent of the latter, average female hours of work remain at 
only around half males hours for the population aged under 65. This estimate is based on 
data from the ABS 1997 Time Use Survey (TUS) sample.
20     
 
The gap between female and male labour supplies is even greater for married couples. 
Table 12 presents the labour supply profiles of couples by age of male partner using data 
for a sample of 1679 couples from the ABS 1997 TUS.
21  Figure 1 plots the profiles to 
show graphically the very large gap between male and female hours.  The overall mean 
for females in the under 65 age category is 956 pa, which is 45.6 per cent of male hours.   
                                                           
20 The female employment rate is 61.6 per cent and the male rate, 80.8 per cent, for those under 65 years, 
which gives a ratio of 76.1 per cent.  The weighted mean of female hours is 883 pa, and for males, 1758 pa, 
which gives a ratio of 50.2 per cent for the full sample. 
21 The sample excludes only those with missing data on the two diary days for which data were collected, 
and a small number of hard to classify records in complex households. 
  22 
Table 12:  Labour supplies by gender  
 
Females Males  Male 





<30  1295  50.0 74.0 2305 90.8 95.1  39.6  1.52 
30-34  993  33.2 64.9 2448 89.6 93.1  73.0  1.95 
35-39  853  27.8 62.0 2365 84.0 88.6  86.0  2.27 
40-44  1093  33.5 70.6 2426 88.3 94.4  87.7  2.29 
45-49  1097  37.7 70.5 2241 88.4 92.3  64.7  1.83 
50-54  977  34.5 67.4 2037 79.0 85.9  46.6  1.68 
55-59  771  27.8 55.1 1770 68.7 77.4  21.9  * 
60-64  468  14.0 34.4 912 31.8 42.8  8.8  * 
65+  80  1.9 8.7 183 6.4 14.4  1.7  * 









































The profiles in the table indicate the inverse relationship that is typically observed 
between female labour supply and the presence and number of children in the early 
phases of the life cycle.  Note, however, that in the later phases when the children have 
left home, there is little to no increase in average female hours, and the gender gap in 
market hours remains at over 50 per cent as hours decline in the later phases of the life 
cycle.  
 
  23The profile of female hours in Figure 1 is obtained by averaging across women with 
children and those with no dependents, and therefore conceals the very large gap that 
exists between the hours worked by women who have not yet had children and those who 
have. Table 13 presents the data means for female and male hours for the sample of all 
couples split into families with dependent children and couples with no dependents.  
Figure 2 depicts the hours profiles graphically. 
 
 
   Table 13  Labour supplies by gender and family status  
 
Female hours pa  Male hours pa  Male 
Age   Children  No children  Children  No children 
<30 471  1606  2226  2036 
30-34 593  1694  2206  2301 
35-39 626  1643  2062  2337 
40-44 946  1308  2146  2382 
45-49 946  1102  2020  2020 
50-54 814 920  1738  1941 
55-59 * 686 *  1546 
60-64 * 371 * 805 


































Male labour supply - with
children
Male labour supply - no
children
Female labour supply -
with children





The average hours of married women without children in the under 30 age category is 
1606 pa, and for those with dependent children, 471 pa. The profiles for the two groups 
  24tend to merge after age 40 because an increasing proportion of the sample begins to 
represent couples whose children have left home after this age, as indicated by the peak 
in the percentage of couples with children at around age 40 in Table 11.     
 
Figure 2 shows that for families with dependent children, the gender hours gap is quite 
extreme.  Up to the age 40 category, the market hours of married mothers are only a 
quarter the hours of husbands. This is due not so much to an especially high rate of non-
participation but to a low rate of full-time employment.  In fact, in the 20 to 60 age range 
married mothers have an overall employment rate that is 68.4 per cent of the male rate - 
the male rate is 91.4 per cent and the female rate, 62.5 per cent.  However, the full-time 
male and female employment rates are 85.8 per cent and 26.1 per cent, respectively.  The 
result is that married mothers with dependent children are found to work only 37 per cent 
of the hours of married men with dependent children.  The more recent ABS SIH data for 
2002 give almost identical labour force profiles for families with dependent children.  For 
the matching sample drawn from the survey the employment rate of married males aged 
20 to 60 and with dependent children is 90.5, and the full-time rate, 85.5.  The overall 
female employment rate is 63.1 per cent while the full time rate is only 27.9 per cent.   
 
This evidence suggests that the Howard Government’s family tax policy, together with 
the failure of successive governments to develop an efficient and affordable public sector 
childcare system, has been effective in discouraging the expansion of female labour 
supply.
22 The very low average hours of married mothers in these data sets suggests that 
the decline in fertility over recent decades has not been matched by a decline in the 
allocation of time to home production, in line with the fall in the demand for domestic 
labour that might be expected to follow the large falls in fertility.   
 
Policies that prevent the efficient reallocation of female time from the home to the market 
will have negative effects on productivity, GDP and the tax base that will be difficult to 
reverse for decades to come.  US studies find that the growth in female hours in recent 
                                                           
22 The negative effects of these kinds of polices on female labour supply are predicted in Apps (1991) using 
the parameters of a labour supply estimated on Australian unit record data.  
  25years is due primarily to an increase in hours worked by younger cohorts of women, and 
that the profile for later cohorts is relatively flat at significantly higher hours.
23 In other 
words, the data indicate strong shifts in the life cycle profile of female hours across 
successive cohorts, initiated in the later cohorts by an increase in the market hours of 
mothers with young children. Thus policies that prevent mothers with young children 
from combining work and family are likely to result in low average hours across the 
entire life cycle, including after the children have left home. 
 
6 Concluding  comment  
 
Any family tax system that combines a set of policy instruments - a formal schedule of 
rates on income, tax offsets, credits and family tax benefits – can always be translated 
into an effective MTR schedule and implicit non-means tested benefit for a given family 
or individual. The fundamentally flawed feature of the Australian family tax system is not 
the size of family tax benefits, but the MTR schedule created by the withdrawal of 
benefits on joint income and the income of the second earner, with the effect of 
selectively taxing her income at a higher rate from the first dollar earned.  
 
Large family benefits can be justified, on both fairness and efficiency criteria, as a 
response to market failure. It is well recognised in the literature that, in the absence of a 
publicly provided system of education and child care, there would be under investment in 
the next generation due to the failure of capital and insurance markets.
24  Moreover, also 
for reasons of market failure, the private, for profit provision of such services is known to 
results in poor quality at a high cost, as is now evident in the long neglected childcare 
                                                           
23 Attanasio et al. (2003) study the life cycle labour supply of three cohorts of American women : those 
born in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s.  The authors find large shifts in the labour supply behaviour of these 
cohorts and attribute it to increases in the early part of the life cycle.  
24 In a perfect capital market, children would be able to borrow to pay for their consumption and investment 
in their human capital, and they would repay the debt during their working years. Clearly, there are 
numerous reasons for why capital markets fail in this context.  For a discussion of the effects on the costs of 
children for parents, see Apps and Rees (2002), and for an analysis of the effects of an imperfect capital 
market on the ability of parents to support their children without working long hours at home and/or in the 
market, see Apps and Rees (2003).  
  26sector.
25  The same conditions justify direct benefits for children.  However, there is no 
sensible rationale for withdrawing the benefits on the basis of family income or the 
income of the second earner, to construct the MTR schedules and distribution of tax 
burdens described in the preceding analysis.  The results of the study highlight the need 
to return to a system that combines a progressive individual income tax with universal 
child benefits.  
 
To see why such a system is superior on equity and efficiency criteria, it is useful to 
consider first the limitations of a flat rate tax. The problem can be illustrated by a simple 
example. Consider two identical young families in which the male partners face the same 
wage rate and, as primary earners, work full time to earn the same income. The female 
partners also face the same wage rate. If, in one family, the mother chooses to work full 
time at home and, in the other, she works full time in the market and uses her income to 
buy-in childcare and substitutes for domestic services, the tax burden of the latter can be 
up to twice that of the former, yet both families may have the same standard of living. 
There is a problem of horizontal equity.  A progressive income tax reduces this problem 
by applying a lower rate to the lower income partner, typically the mother.  Furthermore, 
and importantly, the more progressive the MTR schedule the greater the degree of 
vertical equity.  At the same time the system is more efficient because it applies lower 
MTRs to the incomes of married mothers with highly responsive labour supplies.  Thus 
the system allows the expansion of the tax base required for funding universal family 
support. Life cycle studies show that the gains from a higher level of female labour 
supply also extend quite dramatically to a much higher level of household saving.
26
 
A joint tax system has opposite outcomes. It increases the tax burden on the two-earner 
family, by raising the rate on the second income, and it reduces female labour supply and 
the efficiency of the economy by imposing selectively higher rates on the income of the 
                                                           
25 To appreciate the inefficiencies and consequent high cost of private, for profit, child care, one need only 
consider what would happen if the government were to sell off all its physical assets associated with the 
early years of primary school, and allow the education of children in those years to be provided privately 
and run for profit, without central planning and government support.  Many parents would be unable to 
afford the cost.  Female labour supply would fall as well as school attendance.  
26 See Apps and Rees (2003) for a study demonstrating this using Australian data. 
  27partner with the more responsive labour supply.  It is essentially a system for introducing 
discrimination on the basis of marital and employment status, at a high cost to 
productivity and GDP, and it can expected to lead to a fall in the tax base that will 
ultimately make the present level of family tax benefits unsustainable. 
 
The results of the study show that Australian families are now subject to a tax system that 
closely approximates one of joint taxation, and that they face an effective MTR schedule 
that tends to exhibit an inverted U-shaped profile. As a consequence, second earners in 
low and average wage families face the highest average tax rates in the economy. A tax 
system of this kind, together with a poorly developed childcare sector, offers an 
explanation for the very low average market hours of work by married mothers, and the 
resulting large gap between female and male hours that persists over the life cycle despite 
the sharp decline in fertility in recent decades.   These findings suggest that, in an ageing 
population, Australia’s new family tax system could prove to be the most costly legacy of 
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